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Abstract 
This article argues that recent comparatives literatures on the 
welfare state have yet to adequately consider the public sector and how 
governments have reshaped their public services. Drawing on macro-
level data from the OECD, qualitative studies, and trade union research, 
it is claimed that governments have substantially remade their 
administrative and financial procedures in order to cut expenditures and 
lower labour costs. It is also contended that because of financial 
globalization and rising debt, states have made a series of reforms to 
public sector industrial relations. These have worsened wages, working 
conditions, and jobs throughout the public sector. It is concluded that 
such developments are central to reforming the nature of state 
functioning across North America and Western Europe. This is the first 
study to report on government reforms to fiscal policies, public sector 
services, and public sector labour forces in 13 OECD countries between 
1980-2005. 
 
Résumé 
Cet article avance que les récentes recherches comparatives sur l’État-
providence ne considèrent pas encore de manière adéquate le secteur 
public et comment les gouvernements ont restructuré les services 
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publics. A partir de données macro de l’OCDE, d’études qualitatives et 
de recherches faites par des syndicats, cet article explique que les 
gouvernements ont revu de façon substantielle leurs procédures 
administratives et financières afin de couper leurs dépenses et de 
réduire les coûts du travail. Il est aussi avancé qu’à cause de la 
globalisation financière et de l’augmentation de la dette, les États ont 
engagé une série de réformes dans les relations de travail du secteur 
public. Ceci a aggravé les salaires, les conditions de travail et les emplois 
à travers le secteur public. L’article conclue que de tels développements 
sont centraux à la réforme de la nature du fonctionnement de l’État en 
Amérique du Nord et en Europe de l’Ouest. C’est la première étude qui 
analyse les réformes gouvernementales dans les politiques fiscales, les 
services publics et les employés du secteur public dans 13 pays de 
l’OCDE entre 1980 et 2005. 
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To many, the recent global crisis has been the midwife for the return of 
‘Leviathan’ - of ‘big government’ that interferes with markets and economic efficiency. 
Government public spending is up, in some cases by more than 7 percent of GDP, and 
now most government’s total spending exceeds 40 percent of GDP. Governments have 
bailed out banks on an unprecedented scale, while injecting trillions of dollars of liquidity 
into their economies. In the United States, the American government is largely in charge 
of General Motors; in Britain, government is overseeing high street banks. On top of this, 
governments threaten to take more action to regulate their banks, while also making 
noise to regulate carbon emissions from factories and introduce greater energy efficiency. 
For Nicholas Sarkozy, who has tried to take a leadership role and seriously consider 
alternatives, what all this has meant is the ‘return of the state’. For business publications 
110
  PETERS: The Remaking of Leviathan 
 
such as the economist, these are ominous signs of a foreboding new era of ‘big 
government’ (Economist 2010).  
But a question little asked is ‘what kind of ‘big government’? Because throughout 
the past twenty five years, advanced industrial governments have made substantive 
reforms. Today, the private sector – because of privatisation and contracting out – 
provides more than 40 percent of public goods (OECD 2009). Public sector reforms have 
led to the widespread introduction of market competition throughout departments and 
agencies. There has also been a major shift away from public forms of social protection to 
new privately-financed and privately-provided social insurance. Tax cuts have been deep. 
Tax subsidies – to business as well as to the wealthy and middle classes for capital 
investment and private purchase of insurance and services – have been just as extensive. 
In a longer-term perspective, this seems less a return of ‘big’ government than a return to 
older liberal models of capitalism – state support for business, free trade, open finance, 
ever greater restrictions on social and labour rights, and at the same time the a multi-
trillion dollar bailout of finance paid for by workers and citizens.  
Over the past ten years, many scholarly studies have overlooked these rapid 
transformations and instead emphasised the slow changing nature of states – how welfare 
states are resilient, how institutions create rules that regularise behaviour, and how 
domestic interests defend existing institutions in the face of global economic pressures 
(Castles 2004; Martin and Thelen 2007; Pontusson 2005). One of the key suppositions is 
that left political parties, unions, and the depth of corporatist and collective bargaining 
systems, influence economic and social policy reform, and that governments respond to 
public demand for compensatory social policies (Huber and Stephens 2001; Swank 2002). 
Also widely held is the notion that levels of public consumption are likely to be 
determined less by the extent of need and available resources than by popular views of 
what is considered appropriate, and by how political parties look to support core 
constituencies with appropriate social policies (Beramendi and Cusack 2008; Cusack, 
Iverson, and Rehm 2008; Pierson 2001; Garrett 1998). In these literatures, only in periods 
of crisis does change take place, and it does so in ways moulded by existing institutions, 
politics, and organized interests demands for security and state support.  
However, if scholars have paid close attention to the effects of economic change 
on welfare states as well at how states have reshaped economic environments to promote 
globalization  (Schmidt 2008; Levy 2006), the issues of public sector restructuring and the 
political consequences of public policy reform have received relatively little attention 
from social scientists. This relative lack of attention by comparative scholars to the 
questions of public services and the recent impacts of public service reform on labour 
markets and politics is surprising given the importance governments have attached to 
‘modernizing’ government and reshaping public services over the last twenty years 
(OECD 2009; OECD 2008; OECD 2003). The inattention is also surprising as 
governments have long been the single largest employer in all countries, and public 
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service employment has been a key means for stabilizing jobs and incomes as well as 
ensuring equality (Schulten, Brandt, and Hermann 2008; Lee 2005; OECD 2008). The 
changes in public sectors have also been profound, and have often converged around 
common supply-side and market oriented measures of new public management and 
privatization.  
 In Great Britain, Gerry Mooney and Alex Law (2007) have begun to undertake 
some of this research, demonstrating the impacts of public service change on British 
workers involved in service delivery, showing how wages have fallen, workloads 
increased, and job quality worsened. Other critical scholars in Great Britain have 
examined the negative impacts of privatization and marketization on service quality, 
employment, collective bargaining, and costs to citizens (Hall 2005; Hall and Lethbridge 
2006; Pollock and Leys 2004; Whitfield 2011). However, if British literatures have begun 
to move these debates forward, existing comparative welfare research has not yet analyzed 
these reversals in public sector services and employment, instead focusing primarily on 
spending, governance, and policy reform. The most recent current of welfare state 
research on ‘Dualisation’ has added to our knowledge about public policy changes and 
their political causes and political impacts by exploring how mean-testing and private 
provision arrangements are institutionalizing economic inequality throughout Western 
Europe (Davidsson and Naczyk 2009; Palier and Thelen 2010;). But it too says little about 
how public employment and public sector collective bargaining arrangements have 
themselves been overhauled and reworked as part of broader trends intended to lower 
labour costs.  
Looking to develop a better understanding of what has happened to states and the 
public sector, the goal of this article is to go beyond conventional institutional 
perspectives on the static nature of states and instead provide an assessment of what has 
happened to fiscal policy and public administration since the early 1980s and then 
examine their impacts on organized labour and labour markets. Drawing on recent case 
study and trade union research, it is argued that over the past two decades, states have 
taken active roles in remaking their public sectors either directly through outsourcing or 
more generally by modeling them along the lines of private business throughout North 
America and Western Europe (Bordogna 2008; Brandt and Schulten 2009; Flecker et al. 
2009; Leys 2003; Pedersini 1999; Whitfield 2001). 
Contrary to standard comparative literatures, I argue that major changes have 
indeed taken place to public sector management and operation in many countries 
regardless of political and institutional setup, corporatism, or higher levels of public 
sector spending. Even if there are powerful political forces that stabilize welfare states and 
public expenditures, I claim that the pressures of debt and finance, along with significant 
shifts in domestic politics to the right have led states to lower labour costs and shift their 
public sectors away from considerations of need and towards priorities that are set by 
economics and market models. These shifts in politics and policy have had a negative 
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impact on the public service for one primary reason – states as employers have changed. 
Consequently, it has become much more common for governments to pursue eliminating 
deficits and redesigning their public services as key means to reduce spending and 
lowering labour costs.  
Based on macro-level data collected from thirteen OECD countries that are most 
representative of Nordic and continental European ‘social market economies’ (SMEs) as 
well as the Anglo-American ‘liberal market economies’ (LMEs), (and are conventionally 
believed to respond to economic and social pressure through dramatically different public 
policies), this article looks to assess the extent of convergence of public policy reforms 
around a common set of austerity measures and new public management programmes, 
and whether they have had common consequences on public sector jobs and incomes. 
The paper concludes by suggesting that even if there still are wide variations in public 
sector spending, public sector size, and public service/transfer programmes, the keys to 
understanding recent changes to these lie less in the impacts of stable institutions and 
powerful organized constituencies in deflecting economic pressures, and more with states 
steering among the conflicting pressures of finance, debt, rising inequality, and the 
declining support for redistribution. 
 
Debt and Public Sector Restructuring  
 
Over the past decade, a sizable literature has investigated the link between 
policymaking and business demand for better conditions of profitability and productivity 
(Dumenil and Levy 2004; Glyn 2006; Harvey 2006). As this work has shown, in the wake 
of economic slowdown in the 1980s and 1980s, capital sought low inflation, wage 
restraint and wage flexibility to improve economic growth. Governments sought to 
facilitate conditions for profitable capital accumulation on the part of both domestic and 
foreign capital by tightening fiscal policy, reducing taxes, and balancing budgets. 
Spending cuts were chosen over tax increases as such austerity measures were seen to 
boost the confidence of business and increase employment. Tax cuts were to spur new 
investment and in turn provide the economic growth that would underpin government 
revenue. Reductions in public sector spending were to weaken labour’s bargaining power 
and encourage people to work harder (Whitfield 2001; Panitch and Swartz 2003).  
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As table 1 confirms, debt rose substantially over the period 1990-2005 for the 
majority of countries, and rather than increase taxes, governments cut expenditures. 
Government debt levels rose on average from 44 percent of GDP across these thirteen 
countries to 60 percent from 1980 to 1990 as economic growth slowed, competition 
increased, and tax regimes were shifted. Debt then became substantial rising on average 
another 18 percent to 78 percent of GDP by 1995 with the global recession of the early 
1990s. Debt ratios climbed most quickly in Canada, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, and 
Finland, but also rose substantially in the Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the 
United States, and Sweden. In the UK, debt followed counter-cyclical swings in the 
economy, rising quickly in the early 1990s recession. Only Norway, with its expanding oil 
revenues and oil royalties saw continuing swings in its debt-to-GDP ratios, as resource 
prices contributed to boom-bust cycles of economic growth.  
But the turn to fiscal orthodoxy became much more pronounced over the period 
1995-2005, when all governments reduced general spending on average by 8 percent of 
GDP, and cut expenditures on general public services, social protection, and housing and 
community programs by 2.2 percent, 1.8 percent, and .1 percent of GDP respectively. 
Countries as varied as Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, and Austria 
made the most substantive cuts to both general spending and spending on public services 
and social protection. France and Germany undertook more modest reductions. While 
contrary to expectations, Great Britain and the United States saw the smallest reductions 
Table 1 Debt and Reductions in Government Spending 
Gross Public Debt (as % of GDP)      General Expenditure Public Services  Social Protection
             (as a % of GDP)
1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 1995 2005 Change 1995-2005 1995-2005
Austria 36 57.0 69.0 71.0 71.0 56.3 49.3 -7 -2 -3
Belgium 75 125.5 135.0 113.0 96.0 52.1 48.4 -3.7 -3.8 -0.8
Canada 46 75.0 101.0 82.0 71.0 48.5 39.2 -9.3 -5.1 -2
Germany 31 45.5 55.6 60.0 71.0 59.2 51.2 -8 -4.3 -2.7
Denmark 44 66.0 79.0 57.0 42.0 61.6 48.9 -12.7 -1.3 -5.4
Finland 14 16.0 65.0 52.0 49.0 54.4 52.7 -1.7 -1.2 -1.7
France 30 38.5 62.5 65.5 75.6 54.8 45.4 -9.3 -0.7 -0.5
Italy 89 97.5 112.5 121.0 123.5 52.5 49.9 -2.6 -5.4 -0.1
Netherlands 59 87.5 89.5 64.0 71.5 56.4 45.6 -10.8 -3 -4
Norway 40 29.3 41.0 34.0 49.0 50.9 41.7 -9.5 -2.2 -1.8
Sweden 47 46.0 81.0 65.0 60.0 65.1 54.3 -10.8 -3 -3.8
United Kingdom 49 32.0 51.5 45.1 46.0 44.7 44.3 -0.3 -1 -1.5
United States 41 63.0 70.5 54.5 61.0 37 36.7 -0.3 -1.8 -0.4
Mean 46.2 60 78 68.0 68 54.4 48.4 -8 -2.2 -1.8
Sources : OECD Economic Outlook Annual and Quarterly data (Online);
OECD Stat National Accounts; OECD 2009 General Government Expenditures
by Function
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in general expenditure, and modest cuts to public service and social protection spending 
over the period 1995-2005.  
The priority given to eliminating deficits was highest in countries with high to 
medium increases in debt (rises of more than 29 percent of GDP) and medium to high 
inflows and outflows of capital  (of more than 46 of GDP) – Finland, Sweden, Canada, 
Italy, Austria, Germany, Sweden, and Denmark. In these countries, governments cut 
public service expenditure by 2.7 percent of GDP and overall general spending by 9 
percent of GDP. But others such as France and Belgium also enacted austerity measures,  
either to meet the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact for a maximum overall public 
debt of 60 percent of GDP, or to maintain a budget surplus and meet the monetary goals 
set by the European Central Bank, which was concerned with the rising debt levels of 
individual countries fuelling inflation.   
But also common to countries with rising debts and deficits was a concern to 
redesign their public services and public industries. Governments believed that reshaping 
their ‘micro-economic’ contexts – their wage bargaining systems, their public sectors, and 
their utilities – would impose wage restraint and boost economic growth (OECD 2003, 
2005; 2009). Adopting a classic liberal view that expenditure on public services was a 
burden on the productive sectors of the economy, governments sought to make reforms 
that ensured market forms of coordination would be substituted for public ones wherever 
possible (OECD 2005; Hall 2003). Only with market competition, it was claimed, would 
elected officials be able to reign in self-interested administrators and public sector 
workers and would governments make their public sectors accountable to bottom-lines 
and their public services more efficient.  
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The first step governments took in enacting changes to reshape the size, 
functioning, and ownership of their public sectors was in budgeting and administration 
(Pollit and Bouckaert 2004: 56-102). In countries such as Canada, the United States, 
Finland, and Belgium, governments declared that reducing or reallocating public 
expenditure was a ‘national’ priority, and with central financial officials implemented a 
top-down expenditure cutting process that continued until the target was met (OECD 
2005; Pollit and Bouckaert 2004: 68). Other countries introduced "Top-down" budgeting 
in order to withdraw or allocate funds to specific activities.  And even in countries with 
very fragmented administrative systems, which were commonly assumed to take longer 
to enact administrative and financial change, finance ministries and treasury departments 
were given new roles as the chief overseers for government strategic management in 
order to enact cuts (OECD 2005: 121).  
The next step public officials took to reign in spending was to tie budgeting with 
planning and output measurement (OECD 2007; OECD 2005). Promising to 'do more 
with less', governments established performance goals and benchmarks for agencies and 
sub-national governments. They also transformed programme budgets into block 
funding, and directed lower level elected officials and managers to 'get results'. In the final 
stage, most governments instituted compulsory auditing and instructed auditors to find 
'waste'. Now, over the past ten years, three-quarters of OECD countries use performance 
Table 2 Public Sector Modernization 1990-2007
Performance Budgeting       Scope of Reform            Timing
Budgeting Auditing Comprehensive Partial Big Bang' Incremental
Austria   
Belgium    -a  
Canada     
Germany  
Denmark     - b
Finland    
France    
Italy    
Netherlands    
Norway  
Sweden    
United Kingdom     
United States    
Sources: Pollit and Bouckaert 2004; OECD Performance Budgeting 2007;
OECD Modernising Government 2003;  
EIRO 2006 Industrial Relations in the Public Sector 
a - Belgian reforms were partial until 'Copernican' 
b - Danish reform programme introduced 2007 
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budgeting techniques as means of evaluating programs and implementing budgetary 
decisions and cutbacks (OECD 2005: 18).   
Table 2 provides a summary overview of how many countries enacted budgeting, 
performance, auditing, and major overhauls of their public services and public 
administration. Until 2005, only France and Norway had yet to undertake major reforms. 
Belgium and Denmark were slower to reform their public sectors, but by 2007-2008 both 
countries enacted major administrative and financial overhauls. But with these 
exceptions, governments had enacted public sector reforms intended to cut costs, 
overhaul the financial operations, and reform the labour relations of their public sectors.  
The priority given to fiscal discipline and budget management was complemented 
by attempts to reduce government intervention in the economy. Across the OECD, 
governments restructured their public sector operation through privatization, public-
private-partnerships (P-3s), and outsourcing (table 3). Whether in North America with 
market-oriented conservative governments or Western Europe with highly unionized 
workforces and social democratic governments, state officials sold nationalized industries 
and utilities. In France in the 1990s, the Socialist government of Lionel Jospin made 
major changes to France’s ‘state-led capitalism’ by selling government holdings in 
banking, insurance, electronics, airlines (Levy 2006). Austria sold off banks, oil and gas 
companies, rail and electricity. Rail and telecommunications operations were privatized 
in Finland, Denmark, and Sweden. The Scandinavian countries also changed the public 
ownership of companies with share offerings in everything from postal services to airport 
traffic management (Pedersini 1999; Hall et al. 2006). As table 3 demonstrates, some of 
the largest transformations came in the ‘state-led’ capitalist countries of France, Italy, and 
Austria. But privatizations were also significant in the liberal market economies of Great 
Britain and Canada, as well as the coordinated market economies of Sweden and the 
Netherlands.  
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An equally widespread measure states used to reform their public services were 
public-private partnerships (P3s) – arrangements whereby the private sector finances, 
designs, builds, maintains, and operates infrastructure assets traditionally provided by the 
public sector. Over the past two decade, these were introduced in all OECD countries, 
and their value has risen sharply since 2000 (table 3). Once commonly used for the 
financing and maintenance of transportation infrastructure, by the early 2000s, P3s and 
private financing were used in everything from electrical utilities to schools, hospitals, 
water and sewage, and local public transport (OECD 2003). With EU support, the 
number of P3 projects in Western Europe grew from 12,000 in 1987 to 200,000 in 1999 
(Shaoul 2003: 156).  Available survey evidence indicates that P3s have only grown over 
the past few years. By 2006 there were over 1,100 projects worth $509 billion worldwide, 
with Europe accounting for 43 percent and nearly half of their dollar value (Hall 2008).  
Governments also introduced a number of market structures into the delivery, 
operation, and management of public services through implementing competitive 
bidding structures, outsourcing and 'purchaser-provider' splits in order to have 
employers seek short-term and long-term cost reductions in capital and labour (Table 3) 
(for overviews see Whitfield 2001; Pollit and Bouckaert 2004). The intent of such 
Table 3 Privatisation, PPPs, Outsourcing 1990-2007 
          Privatisation (US Millions) P-3s (US Millions) Outsourcing
    (Percentage of Government Purchases)
1990-5 1996-00 2001-04 2005-07 2003
Austria 2,006 8,400 51.45 1097 33
Belgium 4,186 4,251 1365 1006 28
Canada  10,583 -a           na 3200 705 42
Denmark 1,005 4,913 406 31 40
Finland 1,758 12,301 1061 903 45
France 21,775 36,005 5828 21,674            na
Germany 1,000 14,717 462 1898 43
Italy 15,870 47,603 934.5 3448 25
Netherlands 9,434 2,405 1367 556 45
Norway 712 723           na           na 60
Sweden 3,795 11,984 880 252 55
United Kingdom 51,890 12,154 22941 40114 78
United States    6780 - b            na 3129            na 62
* Provisional.
Sources: Financial Market Trends no. 72, OECD, February 1999, pp. 129-145;
International financial services london, 2009. PFI in the UK and PPP in Europe
Privatization Barometer, Database 1977 to Present available at: http://www.privatizationbarometer.net/database.php
OECD 2003
a- Canada 1990- 2000
b - United States 1990-2000
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liberalisation measures was to force providers – whether public or private – to compete 
with each other for government funding and customers and subsequently increase 
efficiencies through reductions in labour costs (Flecker et al. 2009; OECD 2005: 132). As 
table 3 reveals, competitive bidding and outsourcing became widely used practices, as 
governments introduced competitive tendering and contracting out not only for major 
utilities such as electricity, telecommunications, and waste collection but for a range of 
services from blue collar support services (maintenance, cleaning, laundry, food 
preparation and catering), to professional services such as information technology, to 
core government functions such as prisons (OECD 2003; 2009).  
 
The Reform of Public Sector Labour Relations  
 
International literatures have often emphasised that despite the pressures of 
globalization, differences in welfare state’s distributive patterns have remained. Welfare 
policies have not converged, as increases in inequality continue to be notably larger in the 
inegalitarian liberal economies than in Northern Europe. Tax and benefit systems, it is 
also argued, continue to show varying degrees of effectiveness in reducing poverty and 
redistributing income. But in looking at the effects of fiscal austerity and government 
reform on public sector labour relations, work, and employment, the impacts were much 
more uniformly negative.  
Price and budget-oriented management led to public officials laying off workers, 
introducing wage freezes, and increasing job responsibilities. Privatization and 
marketization gave states and service-employers new levers to enforce wage moderation 
(Brandt and Schulten 2009; Flecker et al 2009; Whitfield 2001). Across the advanced 
industrial economies over the last twenty years, what austerity and public sector 
restructuring have provided for governments was a policy framework to eliminate 
obstacles in labour market flexibility posed by public sector unions and collective 
bargaining structures 
One of the most significant ways governments attempted to redesign their 
traditional public sector labour relations was through ‘New Public Management’, 
emphasising the decentralisation of public sector bargaining structures, the expansion of 
individualised pay through bonuses and performance related pay, and the growth of 
temporary, part-time, and contracted employment (OECD 2008a). Such measures were 
proposed as a means of making pay and employment conditions more responsive to 
variations in local market conditions, organisational requirements, and individual 
employee performance. But their most common results have been the lowering of public 
sector wages, the extension of working hours, and the institutionalization of cheaper 
forms of employment throughout the public sector (Bordogna 2008).  
‘Flexible’ bargaining and new corporatist arrangements were key to ‘New Public 
Management’, and governments used these to restructure labour relations and weaken 
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public sector labour power throughout North America and Western Europe. In Austria, 
Germany, and Italy, for example, where public employees were long excluded from the 
right to conclude collective agreements but were protected through legislation, 
governments rewrote public sector labour relations acts in order to make labour more 
‘flexible’ and deregulate hiring, fire, and pay systems (Bordogna 2008). In these countries, 
the rewriting of labour legislation allowed governments to employ public sector workers 
on a private law basis and then subsequently introduce contracting-out, temporary 
contracts, and more part-time jobs (Brandt and Schulten 2009; Flecker et al 2009).   
In contrast, in Canada, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden 
– where public sector bargaining has long been institutionalized – rather than re-craft 
public sector labour legislation, governments instead decentralised budgets and re-
amalgamated regions and municipalities in order to give officials more leeway in 
contracting out, and to force officials to bargain greater managerial authority over 
performance-related pay, as well as the hiring and termination of employees (OECD 
2005: 167-69). The expectation in these countries was that allowing public managers 
more control over their own staffing establishment (size, grading and qualifications of 
workforce), while limiting their budgets, would lead to lower staffing, fewer full-time 
jobs, and lower labour costs over time. In these ways, governments sought to lower labour 
costs and reduce benefits through introducing more ‘flexible’ pay and working 
conditions.  
Governments also sought to lessen public sector bargaining power by 
decentralising and splitting collective agreements among a number of employers – both 
private and between public and quasi-public employers. Traditionally, public sector 
collective bargaining was done in more centralized and coordinated frameworks. This 
was done to stabilize jobs and wages and ensure continuity in services, and in part to 
draw workers into labour-intensive jobs.  
But as governments have taken on the task of restructuring their public sectors, 
and bring labour costs in line with those in the private sector, public officials sought to 
rework their labour relations and collective bargaining systems in a number of ways 
(Brandt and Schulten 2009: 2-3). Although there are significant national variations in 
timing and extent, bargaining reforms have often included ‘two-tiered’ agreements that 
protect remaining incumbents with good jobs, while allowing newcomers to be employed 
at poorer wages and working conditions (Bordonga 2008).  Also common were new 
agreements that in the aftermath of privatisation allowed companies to withdraw from 
central public sector collective agreements, and then either establish their own company 
agreements, or – in several cases – simply hire workers on an individual contract basis. A 
further measure that reshaped public sector labour relations was local workplace 
administrators adopting outsourcing or ‘contracting out’ as the primary way of lowering 
public sector labour and benefit costs. In these ways, authorities made it much more 
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difficult for unions to ‘compress’ wages and maintain wages and work conditions that 
benefitted all workers.  
A final approach that governments regularly used to attenuate public sector 
collective bargaining was by making changes in financial arrangements and to the final 
employer. In Britain and Canada, for example, both budget and bargaining processes 
were often separated through ‘purchaser-provider’ splits that forced local service 
providers to enact the cuts and restructuring that upper levels of government wanted but 
were not interested in having to directly bear the political costs.  This has led hospitals 
and regional hospital authorities in both countries to act more like independent 
businesses and contract out many of their ancillary services, such as laundry, cleaning, 
and food preparation (Hellowell and Pollock 2007; Lethbridge 2007a). In Sweden, 
Germany, and Austria, two-level collective bargaining was implemented to allow budget 
cuts to be negotiated centrally, while private hospitals, private corporations, or regional 
councils were given the autonomy to cut labour costs by managing hours and introducing 
more ‘flexible’ pay and working conditions.  
In comparative political economy literature, organized labour in the public sector 
is commonly considered to wield political clout and maintain standardized wage and 
work conditions (Beramendi and Cusack 2008; Hou 2009; Mares 2003). But over the past 
twenty years, the evidence suggests this is no longer the case. Public sector unions have 
resisted many restructuring measures, sometimes vigorously. But the far more common 
trend was widening differentiation in bargaining and the growth of low-wage 
employment.  
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Table 4 Public Sector Part-Time and Temporary Employment
         (As a Percentage of Total Employment in Sector)
Public Admin (including mil and defense)         Health and Social Work
1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
Austria 14 16 21 25 35 39
Belgium 18 25 28 37 47 47
Canada 36 37 34 39 52 53
Denmark 24 20 18 35 47 42
Finland 17 16 17 31 30 30
France 29 30 29 34 38 38
Germany 24 25 28 34 39 46
Italy 6 16 14 10 15 23
Netherlands 30 31 39 68 76 78
Norway 22 21 20 43 53 52
Sweden 22 22 27 57 50 55
United Kingdom 18 20 21 46 47 40
United States* 27 23 24 50 42 43
Mean 22 22 24 37 47 43
Sources: Eurostat; Statistics Canada, CANSIM Database; 
Bureau of Labour Statistics, United States. 
* US Figures for Public Administration exclude military and defense; 
US figures for Health and Social Work include education, 
and are based on private, public, and not-for profit providers. 
 
As table 4 shows, one of the results of privatization and public sector restructuring 
was the growth in part-time and temporary public sector employment, which rose in both 
general public administration and health and social work from 1995-2005. The largest 
increases in part-time and temporary health and social work came in Austria, Germany, 
Italy the Netherlands, and Belgium, where private hospitals and hospital networks, and 
purchaser-provider splits in insurance based systems sought to lower costs. But 
significant increases in flexible public sector employment were also seen in countries with 
coordinated bargaining regimes such as Norway and Denmark. In the Netherlands – 
where private insurance and private hospitals worked with unions under flexicurity 
arrangements, part-time and temporary work continued to rise and now makes up over 
three-quarters of the labour force in health and social services. In Canada, public 
hospitals and social service agencies dealt with fiscal constraints by layoffs and increasing 
part-time employment.  
Only in Sweden and Finland was there no significant increase in part-time and 
temporary employment, as unions accepted layoffs and extended unemployment 
compensation in place of the expansion of flexible employment.  But in Sweden, it is 
important to note such adjustment occurred with more half of all employment in health 
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care and social services already on a part-time or temporary basis, and has recently 
expanded again with the growth of private hospitals and purchaser-provider systems 
(Dahlgren 2008). Overall, part-time and temporary employment in health and social 
work rose rapidly from 37 percent of the workforce to 47 percent in the late 1990s before 
declining slightly to 43 percent by 2005.  
Fixed-term contacts for manual and blue collar occupations along with upper 
management contract work also expanded in the late 1990s and early 2000s, reaching 12–
13 percent in countries such as France (including education and armed forces) and Spain, 
and at lower job classifications, involved mostly women and young people. Generally, 
these contractual public servants enjoyed less favourable labour conditions, and for 
women in particular, who work the majority of public service jobs in health, services, 
public administration, and finance, this rise in part-time and fixed term contracts in the 
public sector has meant worsening job security and declines in benefits and long-term job 
prospects (Bordogna 2008). For instance, in Germany and Finland almost two out of 
three of all part-time employees in central government are women (62 percent in 
Germany in 2004; 64 percent in Finland in 2005). In Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Canada, women represent around 73–80 percent of part-time employees, while the 
proportion is even higher the UK.  
These changes have triggered the rise in low-wage public service work throughout 
North America and Western Europe. A general trend in many countries was the growth 
of cleaning, laundry, and food service employees working under part-time, temporary or 
self-employment contracts. Many of these jobs paid well below employment standards or 
collective bargained rates, and many of these workers were employed in facilities where 
staffing levels were between 20 and 30 percent lower (Hall 2008; Hall 2005). Likewise, in 
the largest public service across all countries – health care – it was common for nurses, 
nursing assistants, cleaners, and food providers to work for low or inadequate wages. 
While in long-term care homes, municipal services, and child care, private companies 
and providers alike attempted to lower costs and prove themselves competitive through 
worsening contracts, contracting out, and expanding flexible employment (Hellowell and 
Pollock 2007; Lethbridge 2007).  Consequently, the number of low-wage health care 
workers has grown by more than 50 percent in Germany, Canada, and the United States 
(Bosch and Kalina 2008; Lethbridge 2007). 
Such developments have put the brakes on public sector labour power and 
undermined the institutional supports for public sector employment. Where once 
governments used public services and industries alongside regulatory polices to promote 
income inequality and job security, now public service employment is mirroring trends of 
private service industries, with rising levels of earnings inequality and volatility, increased 
part-time and temporary employment, and more low-wage work. Moreover, where in the 
past unions were able to improve the nature of jobs and the level of wages through 
collective bargaining, financial globalization and supply side policies have pressured 
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states to lower costs and to force through change that weakens labour power and lowers 
labour cost.  
Now part-time and temporary workers are not only more likely to be subject to an 
average wage penalty of 15 percent throughout the EU, and over 45 percent in other 
OECD countries (OECD 2006: 169). Part-time and temporary employees are also more 
likely to receive lower benefits, and in many cases receive no benefits at all. In the United 
States, for example, 66 percent of part-time and temporary workers are not covered by 
employer-sponsored health insurance. And in many countries, such as Canada, Germany, 
Norway, and the United Kingdom, part-time and temporary employees do not qualify for 
occupational pensions (OECD, 2006: 171). While in others, with earnings-related 
protection and pension programs, part-time and temporary workers are more likely to 
receive basic public minimums.  
 
 
Table 5 makes clear that such public sector restructuring measures resulted in the 
decline of public sector employment and public sector compensation in a majority of 
countries. Over the period 1980-2005, public employment declined from peaks in the 
mid-1990s, and only in a few countries did public employment subsequently experience 
low levels of growth, most notably Finland and the UK, where employment growth was in 
part-time and temporary jobs (Table 5). But these small increases in public employment 
did not return public sector employment to previous levels.  
Table 5 Public Sector Employment and Compensation 1980-2005
Public Sector Employment               Public Sector Compensation
                      Percentage of total civilian labour force Percentage of GDP
1980 1990 2000 2005  Decline from 1990 1995 2005
  Peak
Austria    18.93 -b 19.61 13.44 12.60 -6.73 Austria 11.4 12.5 9.3
Belgium 19.17 19.99    18.56 -c 18.5 -2.54 Belgium 10.8 11.9 12.1
Canada 19.97 20.86 19.81 17.50 -2.03 Canada 11.4 13.7 11.4
Denmark 27.98 29.57 30.20 30.90 -1.32 Denmark 17.5 17.1 17
Finland 25.30 23.20 24.38 25.40 -1.48 Finland 13.4 15.1 13.3
France 22.39 25.45 23.45 23.50 -4.24 France 13.2 13.6 13
Germany 14.81 14.93 12.30 11.30 -4.60 Germany 9.7 8.8 7.5
Italy 15.72 17.10 16.38 16.30 -1.72 Italy 11.4 11 7.2
Netherlands 15.11 12.90 11.10 11.40 -5.02 Netherlands 9.8 10.6 9.7
Norway 24.11 28.46 31.75 29.00 -0.64 Norway 14.3 14 12.4
Sweden 35.66 36.83 31.04 29.50 -6.81 Sweden 18.8 16.5 15.6
United Kingdom 21.39 19.66 17.72 19.60 -5.08 United Kingdom 11.6 10.7 11.3
United States 16.49 15.50 15.38 15.40 -1.11 United States 10.5 10.4 10
Mean 21.5 21.9 20.6 20.1 -3.33 Mean 11.4 12.8 11.5
Sources: OECD Stat. National Figures at a Glance 2009
Pollit and Bouckaert 2004; OECD 2008a; Bordogna 2008
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In contrast to the post-war period where governments expanded public services 
and industries to boost full-time employment, stabilize earnings, and underwrite national 
development in the interests of citizens, in the majority of advanced industrial countries 
examined here, public sector employment went increasingly in reverse as its percentage of 
total civilian employment fell on average by 3 percent from former peaks. Looking across 
the period 1980-2005, 8 of the 13 countries saw reductions in public service employment, 
with only Norway, Denmark, and France seeing increases in the public sector workforce, 
through primarily part-time and temporary employees. Overall, however, the decline in 
public sector employment as a percentage of the total civilian labour force was 1.4 percent 
across the thirteen countries here 1980-2005.  
Public sector labour costs were also lowered through privatization, marketization, 
outsourcing, social pacts, and imposed agreements. As table 5 illustrates, compensation 
for government employees as a percentage of GDP declined in 9 of thirteen countries 
1995-2005. The largest declines came in Austria, Canada, Germany, Italy, and Finland, 
each with different political economic institutional setups, and there was a 1 percent 
decline in total compensation in Germany and the Netherlands. Austria reduced public 
sector wage costs the most, using a combination of privatisation, contracting out, public 
sector hiring freezes, and the introduction of regularized ‘private’ collective bargaining, to 
shrink the public sector work force and enforce wage freezes.   
Finland and Norway reduced compensation through coordinated arrangements 
that froze wages and then tied minimums to the private sector and well below growth and 
productivity levels. Canada cut employment and compensation through legislated wage 
freezes, budget reduction, and subsequent provider/employer strategies of layoffs, 
contracting out, and part-time/flex employment. By contrast, in Great Britain – a ‘liberal’ 
regime and the country that has experienced the most widespread attempts at 
marketization in its public sector – actually saw an increase of .58 percent in 
compensation 1995-2005 due in part to the increased role of well-paying contracts for 
consultants and upper management, the increased role of private hospitals, and ongoing 
attempts to introduce flexible employment in labour markets (Pollock and Leys  2005).  
 
Conclusion  
 
Over the past ten years, the preponderance of scholarly studies on the welfare 
state have stressed that there is ‘no race to the bottom’ – despite globalization and the rise 
of market oriented politics, it is commonly argued that welfare state retrenchment and 
public policy reform has been slow and often patterned along partisan and institutional 
lines. But placing state and public policy reform into a broader political economic context 
of debt, financialization, and neoliberal shifts in public sector administration and 
collective bargaining, the evidence strongly supports radical and trade union country 
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studies that a number of incremental and cumulative changes have indeed taken place to 
public sector management and operation in many countries and that regardless of 
political and institutional setup, many of these have had a negative impact – especially on 
public services, public service employment, and public sector collective bargaining.  
Financial globalization alongside debt management led many governments to 
emphasise business and economic growth, and among New Right and Third Way Social 
Democratic parties alike, there is now a widespread consensus that expenditures on 
public services are a burden on the ‘productive’ sectors of the economy and that tax cuts 
and ‘new public management’ reforms are necessary for growth. Consequently, policies of 
fiscal austerity, performance budgeting, contracting out, purchaser-provider splits and so 
on, have been put forward by governments to alter the calculus and priorities of public 
officials, workers, and interest groups alike. Likewise governments have privatized public 
assets in order to reduce direct government expenditures, boost financial profits, and 
lower wage costs. 
Government efforts at reforming and restructuring public sector collective 
bargaining arrangements have similarly enforced wage moderation and worsened jobs, 
attenuating labour bargaining power through layoffs, early retirement, and the growth of 
‘flexible employment’. At the same time, declining worker power, weakening class 
attachment to left political parties, and the rising influence of business on government 
has significantly transformed government and domestic policy making.  Consequently, 
states have now taken the lead to transform their public sectors along more market-
oriented lines.  
The results presented here suggest that a major shift has occurred across advanced 
industrial states, and these appear to have been the result of explicit political design to 
lower public labour costs and shift service provision to private benefits and private 
market providers. To further assess to what extent this convergence is occurring, future 
comparative research on the state, policy, capitalism, and labour would be well served to 
explore more deeply the impacts of public sector reform on redistribution, jobs, and 
income security and examine to what degree debt, finance, and public sector bargaining 
structures have patterned policy and labour market outcomes. 
A second important topic for future research on the state and labour is the politics 
of public sector reform and the reasons for partisan and country differences in the extent 
of public sector restructuring. Recent literatures on the ‘dualisation’ of societies have 
suggested that as the distribution and coverage of social programmes have deteriorated, 
recent welfare states reforms have perpetuated the structures of advantage and 
disadvantage in the labour market, and contributed to a politics that enforces divides 
between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (Davidsson and Naczyk 2009; Palier and Thelen 2010). 
The evidence here suggests that public sector ‘modernization’, ‘marketization’, and 
reform is having similar political consequences.  
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Policies such as privatization are boosting income inequality through expanding 
stock markets and financial returns. Likewise, in the case of public sector restructuring, 
the government introduction of privatization and the restructuring of collective 
bargaining has given public, private, public-private, and municipal authorities alike the 
power to pay lower wages and benefits to recent recruits. At the same time, proportional 
reductions in public employment are lowering the wage share of unskilled workers, and 
contributing to greater inequality and the expansion of lower-paid private sector jobs. 
This too is adding to wage and income inequality.  
However, rising inequality is known to be a contributing factor to stronger 
median voter opposition to redistribution (Anderson and Beremendi 2008). Increasing 
inequality is also associated with lower voter turnouts and to voter demobilization, both 
of which also are contributing to shifts in party policy preferences.  
But to what degree public sector reforms are correlated to recent trends in lower 
voter turnouts, greater class de- or re-alignment, and the declining support of workers for 
left and social democratic parties is not known. Over the past decade, across Western 
Europe, political parties and party systems stopped providing much in the way of support 
for their public sectors or organized labour in the 1980s and 1990s (Moschonas 2002). 
Rather Social Democratic parties have regularly resorted as a matter of course to ‘Third 
Way’ policies that promoted business and the market while pushing labour to become 
more flexible and the unemployed more ‘active’ (Hou 2009). At the same time, no fewer 
than nine Centre-Right governments came to power in Western Europe over the last ten 
years, with the majority having populist, tax-cut-oriented, populist Right coalition 
partners.  Given the impacts of public sector restructuring on employment and wages, 
future research that carefully considers how public sector reform processes are tied to 
these partisan shifts, the rise in inequality, and policy outcomes may do much to improve 
our understanding of recent changes in political economy.  
A final area of research required will be on the impacts of the current financial 
crisis on the public sector. Over the course of 2009-2011, governments brought forward a 
number of ‘exit’ strategies intended to return the world economy to ‘normal’ and ‘stable’ 
rates of growth (Albo and Evans 2011). With the average debt burden in OECD countries 
expected to rise above 100 percent of GDP, every government put forward ‘exit’ strategies 
that emphasised deficit reduction, tax cuts, and ‘structural’ reforms to labour market and 
social policy. ‘Fiscal exit strategies’ included cutting public expenditures, public sector 
wage freezes and layoffs, as well as further corporate tax cuts. ‘Structural adjustments’ 
central to the governments strategy entailed rolling back public sector pensions, the 
privatization of further national industries, and further changes to public sector collective 
bargaining, including withdrawing the right to strike (OECD 2010).  
Public sector unions and citizens alike have protested these policies. Around the 
world, in Britain, France, Greece, Spain, and Wisconsin USA, government austerity 
policies have brought public sector workers out onto the streets (Evans and Hussey 2011). 
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However, unions are finding it difficult to win these battles, and the pressure to 
rationalise the public sector even further is likely to continue in the coming years.  
Comparative scholarship has long assumed that public sector unions are able to 
mobilize public support and that governments respond to the problems that affect broad 
majorities. But in the most recent events, such assumptions no longer appear to hold. 
Governments are going forward with major policy initiatives that support financial and 
bond markets, and that do much less to reduce inequality through public services and 
employment. Examining the reasons for this ‘backlash’ against government and the 
public sector, in the context of ongoing state support for finance and the wealthy, will do 
much to improve our understanding of the politics of welfare state change. Such research 
will also do much to enhance our appraisals of state change and the ongoing fundamental 
conflicts over income, equality, and jobs.  
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